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Sharon N. Freytag,* Don D. Bush,** and James Paul George***
ONFLICTS of law occur when foreign elements appear in a lawsuit.
Nonresident litigants, incidents in sister states or foreign countries,
and lawsuits from other jurisdictions represent foreign elements that
may create problems in judicial jurisdiction, choice of law, or recognition of
foreign judgments, respectively. This Article reviews Texas conflicts of law
during the Survey period from late 1987 through 1988. The survey includes
cases from Texas state and federal courts. Excluded are cases involving fed-
eral state conflicts, criminal law, intrastate matters such as subject matter
jurisdiction and venue, and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of
prior or subsequent law within a state.
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court effected no signifi-
cant changes or additions to jurisdictional jurisprudence, but the Northern
District of Texas did craft a rule for personal jurisdiction in federal question
cases when nationwide service of process is authorized. Cases decided dur-
ing the Survey period also exhibited both the use of rule 108 as a substitute
for the Texas long-arm statute and the difficulty in imputing jurisdictional
contacts between parent and subsidiary corporations. Choice of law high-
lights include a controversial rejection of a Florida noncompetition agree-
ment, as well as the United States Supreme Court's sequel to a 1985 opinion
on legislative jurisdiction. Foreign judgments offered three noteworthy cases
but no developments.
I. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION'
To assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must ensure
that the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and that juris-
diction has been properly invoked through valid service of process on the
* B.A., University of Kansas; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Southern Methodist
University. Attorney, Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., University of Indiana; J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University. Attorney,
Johnson, Bromberg and Leeds, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., Oklahoma State University; J.D., University of Tulsa; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Attorney, Johnson, Bromberg and Leeds, Dallas, Texas.
1. Judicial jurisdiction is distinct from legislative jurisdiction in that the latter concerns
"whether the state, through its courts or otherwise, has power to act upon the matter in issue
by using the state's rules of law to regulate or control it" while the former concerns the power
of a court to act "against the particular person (usually the defendant) against whom or thing
against which, the court is asked to act." R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 3, at 4
(3d ed. 1977) (emphasis in original).
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defendant. In diversity cases, amenability necessitates two inquiries: (1) Is
the defendant amenable to service of process under a long-arm statute or
rule of the forum state? (2) Is the assertion of jurisdiction consistent with
due process? 2 In federal question cases, the state long-arm statute need not
be used if nationwide service is authorized, and the due process inquiry is
grounded in the fifth amendment. During the Survey period, most activity
in the area of judicial jurisdiction occurred in the federal courts. With one
exception, each case addresses both amenability and service of process. As a
result, this Article does not discuss the two concepts separately.
A. Texas Federal Courts
In Entek Corporation v. Southwest Pipe & Supply Co. 3 the court addressed
the minimum contacts standard to be applied in a federal question case when
a statute authorizes nationwide service of process.4 Summarizing the factual
allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, the court noted that the plaintiff Tur-
ner, sole owner and president of Entek Corporation, also a plaintiff, invented
Leaky Pipe, an irrigation pipe, and a process to manufacture the pipe. Entek
owned three patents covering Leaky Pipe and the manufacturing process.
Entek entered into a distribution agreement with defendant Chipman,
which granted Chipman the right to distribute Leaky Pipe in Florida. Chip-
man and defendant Mason visited the Leaky Pipe plant in Texas, where both
Chipman and Mason signed confidentiality agreements, promising not to
misappropriate any information they would receive. After Chipman and
Mason received technical secrets on the manufacturing process, however,
they used the information to apply for patents.
Defendant Chipman then formed Aquapore Corporation, also named as a
defendant, which began to manufacture and market a porous pipe using the
secrets obtained from plaintiffs. Both Chipman and Mason received a loan
from Dasurat Enterprises PTE LTD, a defendant. Aquapore contracted
with the defendant Powell Duffryn Public Limited Co. (PDPLC), among
others, to market the pipe worldwide. Defendant Keysor manufactured the
pipe.
In plaintiffs' suit alleging, inter alia, violations of the antitrust laws, plain-
tiffs served all defendants except PDPLC and Dasurat pursuant to the Texas
long-arm statute. Plaintiffs personally served PDPLC and Dasurat under
2. The two inquiries essentially collapse into one because the Texas Supreme Court has
interpreted the Texas long-arm statute to reach to the very limits of due process. U-Anchor
Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court divides the constitutional inquiry into two parts: whether
the non-resident defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state
and whether the exercise ofjurisdiction results in fair play and substantial justice. Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09, 113 (1987).
3. 683 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
4. In a federal question case, fifth amendment due process controls, but the fourteenth
amendment standards of International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), may be used.
683 F. Supp. at 1096 n.5.
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rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Defendants contested
personal jurisdiction; the court thus addressed the standard for asserting per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant in a federal question case.
Summarizing the holding of Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Interna-
tional Ltd. ,6 the court observed that when a federal question case is based
upon a federal statute that is silent as to service of process, rule 4(e) adopts
the state provisions for both manner and amenability of service.7 As a re-
sult, when nationwide service is not authorized, a federal district court has
no personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a federal question case, unless he
can be reached by the long-arm statute of the forum statute. The court dis-
tinguished Point Landing 8 and noted that the statute relevant to the case sub
judice, United States Code title 15, Section 22, authorized nationwide service
as to the corporate defendants. 9 Reading Point Landing in conjunction with
Terry v. Raymond International, Inc., 0 the Entek court held: "In a federal
question case in which nationwide service is statutorily authorized, mini-
mum contacts with the United States will satisfy the due process prong of
the personal jurisdiction test."'1 I Thus, the plaintiffs in Entek needed to es-
tablish only that the corporate defendants had minimum contacts with the
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) provides alternative provisions for service of process in a foreign
country.
6. 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd sub. nom. Omni Capital
Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 98 L.Ed. 2d 415 (1987).
7. The court observed that not only is the case law discussing personal jurisdiction and
nationwide service of process unclear, but also that the very possibility of nationwide personal
jurisdiction has been questioned. Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 165, 168 (W.D. Tex.
1983).
8. 795 F.2d 415.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1973) provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation
may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but
also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process
and such cases may be served in the district in which it is an inhabitant, or
wherever it may be found.
10. 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 28 (1982). The court in Terry held
that "[tihe contours of amenability [to jurisdiction] in non-diversity cases are more fluid" than
the contours of amenability to jurisdiction in diversity cases. Id. at 401.
11. 683 F. Supp. at 1100. The court noted that the distinction between federal question
cases in which nationwide service of process is statutorily authorized and those in which the
statute is silent as to service is reflected in rule 4(e). Id. at 1100-01.
Rule 4(e) provides:
Summons: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State.
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder pro-
vides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons
upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district
court is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner
prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing
the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule
of court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of
a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an
inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to such
a party to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attach-
ment or garnishment or similar seizure of the party's property located within the
state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
1989]
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United States. ' 2
Finding a dearth of cases on the meaning of minimum contacts with the
United States, the court rejected the analysis in Bamford v. Hobbs,'3 which
held that a court could not exercise nationwide jurisdiction over a defendant
even though the law permitted nationwide service unless a defendant had
adequate nationwide contacts, as opposed to regional contacts.' 4 The Entek
court rejected the Bamford modified nationwide jurisdiction analysis for two
reasons: (1) it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's "contacts plus"
analysis of personal jurisdiction, 15 and (2) it leaves businesses wishing to
avoid nationwide jurisdiction without guidance as to how many contacts are
too many contacts with too many states.16
Without guidance itself as to the meaning of minimum contacts with the
United States, the Entek court used the minimum contacts analysis
grounded in Burger King 17 and applied it to the entire United States, rather
than to an individual state.' 8 In so doing, the court accepted the plaintiffs'
allegation that PDPLC' 9 had minimum contacts with the United States as
true because it was uncontroverted by PDPLC, who had submitted evidence
only that it lacked contacts with Texas. 20 The court further determined that
the exercise of jurisdiction over PDPLC would comport with traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice. 2' With regard to PDUSA,
Aquapore, Moisture Systems and Keysor,22 the court simply noted that
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (emphasis added).
The court noted that the case sub judice falls under the first sentence of rule 4(e). 683 F.
Supp. at 101 n.16.
12. The plaintiffs, however, still had the burden of establishing that each individual de-
fendant had minimum contacts with Texas. Relying primarily upon Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), the court determined that defendants Chipman and Mason
had minimum contacts with Texas through having visited the Entek plant in Texas, having
signed a confidentiality agreement with the plaintiffs in Texas and having made telephone calls
to plaintiff Turner in Texas. 683 F. Supp. at 1098. The court determined that both the forum
state's and the judicial system's interest would be best served by exercising personal jurisdic-
tion over both Mason and Chipman. Id.
13. 569 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
14. 683 F. Supp. at 1102. The Bamford court observed that the rejection of sovereignty as
a basis for personal jurisdiction in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), meant that there was no compelling reason for a court to observe
sovereign boundaries and to equate fair play and substantial justice with minimum contacts
with the United States. 569 F. Supp. at 166
15. "Contacts plus" refers to the due process requirement of minimum contacts, plus the
requirement that the maintenance of the suit comport with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. 683 F. Supp. at 1102 n.18.
16. Id. at 1102. Given the decision in Entek, Texas practitioners are now faced with the
conflict between Bamford in the Southern District of Texas and Entek in the Northern District
of Texas.
17. 471 U.S. 462 (1984).
18. 683 F. Supp. at 1102.
19. PDPLC was an English corporation. 683 F. Supp. at 1102.
20. Id. The court observed that all of the corporate defendants had briefed the "irrelevant
issue of whether they [had] minimum contacts with Texas." Id. at 1099.
21. Id.
22. PDUSA was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Connecti-
cut. 683 F. Supp. at 1104. Aquapore was a Florida corporation with its principal place of
business in Florida. Id. at 1105. Moisture Systems was an Illinois corporation with its princi-
[Vol. 43
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these companies were all American corporations with the requisite mini-
mum contacts with the United States.23 With regard to Dasurat, a Singa-
pore corporation, the court determined that personal jurisdiction did not
exist. 24 Dasurat's only act in the United States involved the recording by
Dasurat of defendant Mason's assignment of his patent application to
Dasurat in the United States Patent & Trademark office. This single act did
not satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. 25
Turning to the service of process issue, the court noted that even in a
federal question case in which nationwide service is authorized by statute, if
plaintiffs choose to serve process by the Texas long-arm statute, they must
comply with that statute's requirements.26 Corporate defendants in an anti-
trust suit need not be served pursuant to the forum state's long-arm statute,
but if they are so served, then the long-arm statute's requirements must be
satisfied, including the requirement of minimum contacts with the state.27
Service thus became the key to the assertion of jurisdiction in Entek.
The court thereafter determined that PDPLC had been properly served
pursuant to rule 4(i), rather than pursuant to the Texas long-arm. 28 Of the
remaining defendants served pursuant to the Texas long-arm, PDUSA and
Keysor did not have minimum contacts with Texas. PDUSA was strictly a
Delaware holding company that did not offer any goods or services to the
public and had no contacts with any Texas residents. The court rejected the
parent/subsidiary argument that PDUSA was an alter ego of Southwest
Pipe & Supply Co., that Southwest was an alter ego of National, a Texas
corporation, and that minimum contacts with Texas were thereby estab-
lished.29 The court, citing Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp.,30 observed that
only a close relationship between a parent and a subsidiary justifies a finding
that the parent does business in a jurisdiction through the local activities of
its subsidiaries. 31 The court found that Keysor had no minimum contacts
with Texas because it sold products FOB at its manufacturing facility in
California and not directly to Texas merchants. 32 The court found, how-
ever, that Aquapore and Moisture Systems did have minimum contacts with
Texas insofar as both sold products to merchants in Texas out of which sales
the plaintiffs' claims arose. 33
pal place of business in Illinois. Id. Keysor was a California corporation with its principal
place of business in California, Id.
23. Id. at 1103.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1973), which authorizes nationwide service, does not specify the
manner of service. A plaintiff must then turn to FED. R. Civ. P. 4, which provides alternative
methods, one of which is service pursuant to the state long-arm statute. Plaintiffs in Entek
selected this method. 683 F. Supp. at 1103 n.23.
27. 683 F. Supp. at 1104.
28. Id., see supra note 5.
29. Both Southwest and National had withdrawn their motions to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. 683 F. Supp. at 1096 n.1.
30. 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. at 1983).
31. 683 F. Supp. at 1104-05.
32. Id. at 1106.
33. Id. at 1105-06.
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The Entek case emphasizes the need for a plaintiff bringing a federal ques-
tion suit to select the manner of service under rule 4 carefully. According to
the Entek court, relying on rule 4(e) and a state long-arm statute in a case
involving statutorily authorized nationwide service imposes a more stringent
minimum contacts requirement than if a plaintiff relies upon the other alter-
natives available in rule 4(d) or rule 4(i). 34
In Deininger v. Deininger3 5 the court, in a diversity suit, addressed the use
of rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as an alternative method of
service to the Texas long-arm statute.36 The plaintiff, Eleanor Deininger,
filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that certain orders entered seven-
teen years earlier by the circuit court of DuPage County in Illinois be de-
clared void because plaintiff was denied due process upon their entry. The
plaintiff further claimed that the defendants-her husband, John Deininger,
and his attorney, Paul McLennon--defrauded her in connection with the
issuance of the orders. The plaintiff filed the complaint pro se. Both defend-
ants contested personal jurisdiction.
Defendants argued that plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants had
conducted business in Texas or that the alleged fraud providing the basis of
plaintiff's claim had occurred in whole on in part in Texas. Thus, plaintiff
had not satisfied the requirements of the Texas long-arm statute. The court
observed that the defendants' argument would be correct if it were not for
the existence of rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vides an "alternative method of service" allowing a plaintiff to avoid the
"doing business" requirements of the Texas long-arm statute.37 The court
emphasized, however, that rule 108, like the Texas long-arm statute, must be
construed in the context of the due process requirements of the United States
Constitution.38 When analyzing the due process requirements for personal
jurisdiction, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to meet her
burden of demonstrating the propriety of the exercise of either specific or
general jurisdiction. 39
Although John Deininger's employer, Signode Corporation, had some
contact with Texas, the defendant himself had none. His contacts were
solely those of his corporate employer, all unrelated to the cause of action
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
35. 677 F. Supp. 486 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
36. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
37. 677 F. Supp. at 489. The court, conceding that plaintiff did not allege that service was
proper under rule 108, determined that it was not "an unprecedented act of judicial activism"
to conclude that plaintiff's service was proper under rule 108. Id. at 490.
38. Id. The Texas Supreme Court also addressed rule 108 during this survey period,
pointing out that while rule 108 may allow a plaintiff some flexibility in alleging jurisdiction
over a defendant, the jurisdictional allegations must be sufficient under the Constitution of the
United States. See Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1988).
39. 677 F. Supp. at 493-94. The United States Supreme Court first used the term "specific
jurisdiction" in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), to
refer to the exercise of "jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the
defendants' contacts with the forum." Id. at 414 n.8. General jurisdiction exists when a state
exercises jurisdiction over a defendant, and the suit does not arise out of or is not related to the
defendants' contacts with the forum. Id. at 414 n.9.
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based on the issuance of the Illinois court orders. Moreover, Paul McLen-
non, an Illinois attorney who had never practiced law in Texas, done busi-
ness in Texas or, indeed, ever been in Texas, could not be subject to the
court's jurisdiction. Deininger, therefore, demonstrates that while rule 108
provides a valid procedural alternative to the Texas long-arm statute, it does
not, by itself, confer jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.4 °
In Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo, Ltd.4 1 the court also considered rule
108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure42, as well as the stream of com-
merce theory addressed by both the United States Supreme Court and the
Fifth Circuit during the last Survey period.43 Edwin Smith was injured
when he was using an engine lathe manufactured in Japan by defendant
Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo, Ltd. ("Dainichi-Japan"). A Japanese export
company ("Gomiya-Japan") purchased the lathe in Japan and sold it to their
American subsidiary, Gomiya U.S.A., to be imported into the United States.
Gomiya U.S.A. sold the lathe to an American machine tool retailer, Ma-
chinery Sales Co., Inc., a California corporation that did business exclusively
in California, Arizona and Nevada. Finally, Machinery Sales Co., Inc. sold
the lathe to Martin-Decker, the plaintiff's employer in California, which
thereafter transported the lathe to its machine shop in Cedar Park, Texas
where plaintiff Smith's injury occurred.
The defendants Dainichi-Japan, Dainichi-USA and Machinery Sales Co.
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The latter
two defendants argued that service of process was insufficient because the
plaintiff did not serve the Texas Secretary of State as defendants' agent for
service of process as required by rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure44 and the Texas long-arm statute.4 5 Instead, the plaintiff mailed ser-
vice to the defendants pursuant to rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court observed that section 17.044(a) of the Texas Civil
Practices and Remedies Code46 providing for service on the Secretary of
State is not a mandatory method of service that supplants rule 108. 4 7
Rather, section 17.044(a) provides an alternative to the method of service
allowed under Rule 108, with which plaintiff complied for service upon
Dainichi-U.S. and Machinery Sales Co. 4 8 With regard to Dainichi-Japan,
the court determined that service by registered mail sufficiently complied
with article 10(a) of the Haag Convention.49
Having deemed the service of process proper, the court turned to the con-
40. 677 F. Supp. at 490.
41. 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988)..
42. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
43. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, (1987); Bearry v.
Beech Aircraft Corporation, 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
45. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM CODE ANN. § 17.045 (Vernon 1986).
46. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044(a) (Vernon 1986).
47. 680 F. Supp. at 849.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 851.
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stitutional inquiry5o and the stream of commerce analysis. "The constitu-
tional inquiry ... consists of two elements: (1) the non-resident must have
some minimum contact with the forum which results from an affirmative act
on the part of the non-resident and (2) it must be fair and reasonable to
require the nonresident to defend the suit in the forum state."51 Noting the
jurisdictional facts of the case, the court determined that specific jurisdiction
could not be exercised over Dainichi-Japan unless the court found that the
lathe was put into the stream of commerce with an expectation of purchase
or use by Texans. 52 As recounted above, defendant Dainichi-Japan sold
lathes to a Japanese distributor in Japan, which then transported the lathes
to the United States and distributed the lathes to independent regional retail
distributors with limited sales areas. A regional retailer that served only the
states of California, Arizona and Nevada sold the lathe in question. There
was nothing to show that Dainichi-Japan expected the lathe to be purchased
or used by Texas consumers.5 3 As a result, the court determined that spe-
cific jurisdiction was lacking. 54 Plaintiff argued that the court should exer-
cise general jurisdiction because Dainichi-Japan advertised its products in
Texas. The court determined that those facts alone would not support gen-
eral jurisdiction.5 5 Observing that a defendant must purposefully invoke the
benefits and protections of a forum state before constructively consenting to
being sued there, the court emphasized that the lathe came into Texas solely
because of the unilateral act of Martin-Decker, Mr. Smith's employer.5 6
Dainichi-Japan had no part in bringing the lathe that injured Mr. Smith into
the Texas and had no reason to expect that the lathe would be moved to
Texas.5 7
Plaintiff further argued that Dainichi-U.S. was the alter ego of Dainichi-
Japan and that the court should pierce the corporate veil to impute the con-
tacts of Dainichi-U.S. with Texas to its parent company. The court observed
that in order to disregard the corporate fiction and hold a parent liable for
the acts of the subsidiary, "the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
corporate structure is being used as a sham to perpetuate a fraud, to avoid
liability, to avoid the effect of a statute or other exceptional circumstances
which would warrant an exception to the general rule of recognizing the
corporate fiction." s5 8 Plaintiff produced no evidence to controvert the de-
fendants' evidence that each corporation, Dainichi-U.S. and Dainichi-Japan,
50. The court noted that the Texas long-arm statute collapses into and becomes a part of
the constitutional due process inquiry. See supra note 2. Accordingly, the inquiry is whether
the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants comports with the constitutional requirements
of due process. 680 F. Supp. at 851. Dainichi-U.S. did not contest jurisdiction on due process
grounds.
51. Id., (citing Burger King Co. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).




55. Id. at 853.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 854.
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was a separate and distinct corporate entity with its own board of directors
and its own financing. As a result, the court refused to pierce the corporate
veil and impute the contacts of Dainichi-U.S. to Dainichi-Japan.5 9
With regard to the issue of personal jurisdiction over Machinery Sales
Co., the facts revealed that it was a California corporation that sold machine
tools, including engine lathes manufactured by Dainichi-Japan in California,
Arizona and Nevada, was not registered to do business in Texas, maintained
no office in Texas and had no officer, agent or employee in Texas. The only
tenuous connection between Machinery Sales Co. and Texas was that Ma-
chinery Sales sold the lathe that injured Mr. Smith to Martin-Decker in Cal-
ifornia, and Martin-Decker removed it to Texas. As a result, it could not be
said that Machinery Sales Co. had reasonably anticipated being haled into
court in Texas; the court, therefore, lacked personal jurisdiction over that
defendant as well. 6° The Dainichi court, having determined that neither
Dainichi-Japan nor Machinery Sales Co. had the expectation that the lathe
would reach Texas, did not face the issue left open by the Supreme Court
last year in Asahi: is mere awareness by a foreign defendant that its goods
will reach a state, without direct activity in the forum by that defendant,
sufficient for the assertion of jurisdiction?61
InterFirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez62 addressed issues of both judicial
jurisdiction and choice of law. In its decision related to judicial jurisdiction,
the court reviewed the following jurisdictional facts. The defendant Fernan-
dez, a Louisiana businessman, arranged for InterFirst Bank Clifton to fi-
nance the purchase of an aircraft. As part of the purchase, Fernandez signed
sale and loan documents including a loan commitment agreement, a
$550,000.00 promissory note and a security agreement. Unable to make
payments on the note, Fernandez delivered the airplane to a broker in Penn-
sylvania to attempt a sale. When that attempt failed, InterFirst contacted
Fernandez and informed him of an interested buyer in Texas. Fernandez
thus agreed to return the plane to Texas. Thereafter, Interfirst accelerated
the note and made demand for full payment. Fernandez received and signed
a letter from InterFirst in which he consented to Texas foreclosure proce-
dures and waived his rights under Louisiana law. 63 Approximately two
years later, InterFirst sold the plane in a private foreclosure sale for less than
half the price for which Fernandez purchased it in 1981.
When InterFirst filed suit in state district court to recover the deficiency,
Fernandez removed the suit to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The federal district court denied the motion.64
59. Id. at 854-55.
60. Id. at 854.
61. Cf. Keen v. Ashot Ashkelon, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 209 (1987) (as opposed to "mere
awareness" that a product may enter a state, this court found a "reasonable expectation" that
a product would enter the state to be sufficient).
62. 844 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1988).
63. See infra notes 181-190 and accompanying text.
64. The letter signed by Fernandez consented to sale under Texas foreclosure procedures
and agreed to liability for any deficiency between the sale price and the amount of the note.
844 F.2d at 283-84.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 65 The
court observed that the loan agreement between Fernandez and InterFirst
combined with other contacts showed a purposeful availment of the laws of
Texas.66 The court further observed that Fernandez called to Texas to
purchase the plane; he voluntarily agreed to finance the plane through a
Texas bank; he signed a loan agreement containing a Texas choice of law
clause; he later agreed to return the plane to Texas for sale; and most signifi-
cantly, he signed a letter consenting to sale under Texas foreclosure proce-
dures and agreeing to liability for any deficiency between the sale price and
the amount of the note.67
Further, the court determined that the assertion of jurisdiction comported
with fair play and substantial justice.68 Noting that a defendant must pres-
ent a compelling case that jurisdiction is unreasonable, the court considered
the burden on the defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, the plaintiff's interest in maintaining convenient and effective relief,
the interstate judidical system's interest in obtaining the most efficient reso-
lution of controversies and the shared interest of the several states in further-
ing fundamental substantive social policies. 69 Considering these factors, the
court noted that the burden on Fernandez to defend the action in Texas
could be greater than the burden on InterFirst to bring the suit in Louisiana,
but Fernandez made no showing of evidence that would be available in Loui-
siana but unavailable in Texas.70 Moreover, he was only asked to travel to a
neighboring state.7' Regarding the interest of the forum state, the court
noted that Texas has a legitimate concern in carrying out its own laws and
protecting its own creditors. 72 In contrast to Asahi, the plaintiff in Fernan-
dez was a Texas resident seeking protection as the creditor under the foreclo-
sure laws of Texas.73 The court further found, without analysis, that the
exercise of jurisdiction by a Texas court was not inconsistent with Louisi-
ana's interest. 74
In Southmark Corporation v. Life Investors, Inc.75 the court considered the
application of the "effects" test of Calder v. Jones76 and determined that it
did not apply to the facts in Southmark.77 Life, an insurance holding com-
pany organized and existing under the laws of Iowa, together with George
65. Id. at 282.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 284. The court emphasized that a loan agreement combined with a Texas
choice of law provision does not necessarily produce the minimum contacts necessary for spe-
cific jurisdiction. Id. at 283. The court however, found conclusive the letter agreeing to a
foreclosure sale and deficiency liability under Texas law to be conclusive. Id. at 284.
68. Id. at 283.
69. Id. at 284-85.
70. Id. at 284, (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
71. Id. at 285.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 287.
75. 851 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1988).
76. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The Court held jurisdiction proper in California based on the
"effects" of petitioners' Florida conduct in California. Id. at 789.
77. 851 F.2d at 772.
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Olmsted, owned a controlling share of stock in International Bank (IB), an
Arizona corporation. Olmsted and Life entered into a memorandum of un-
derstanding in which Life agreed that, if it wished to sell its IB stock, it
would first offer the stock to Olmsted who had thirty days right of refusal.
In early 1985 Southmark began negotiating with Life for the sale of Life's
stock to Southmark. In May 1985 Life offered its shares to Olmstead who,
after initially accepting, refused to purchase them. Southmark later claimed
that after Olmstead's refusal, Life and Southmark reached a meeting of the
minds and formed a contract of sale; Life, however, denied such a contract.
Southmark brought suit against Life for breaching the alleged agreement to
sell the stock to Southmark. Southmark joined USLICO, the corporation to
which Life had eventually agreed to sell its shares of stock in IB corporation,
claiming tortious interference. USLICO moved to dismiss the complaint
based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court determined that
USLICO's contacts with Texas were not sufficient to establish in personam
jurisdiction and granted the motion to dismiss. 78
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Southmark relied primarily on Calder v.
Jones,79 contending that the district court had specific jurisdiction over US-
LICO because of prima facie evidence that USLICO committed an interna-
tional tort against Southmark in Texas with knowledge that Southmark was
a Texas resident. 80 The Fifth Circuit found Southmark's reliance on Calder
misplaced. 8 1 The Supreme Court in Calder determined that an alleged
tortfeasor's intentional actions which are expressly aimed at the forum state,
with knowledge that a resident of that state will feel the brunt of any injury,
may subject the tortfeasor to personal jurisdiction there.8 2 In contrast, US-
LICO had not expressly aimed its allegedly tortious activities at Texas, nor
was there evidence of USLICO's knowledge that Southmark would feel any
injury there.8 3 The oral agreement with which USLICO allegedly interfered
was apparently negotiated and made in Atlanta and/or New York; there was
no evidence that the agreement was made or to be performed in Texas. The
stock that USLICO purchased was not the stock of a Texas corporation nor
did USLICO do any business in Texas. USLICO was a Virginia company
domiciled in Washington, D.C. Nothing in the record indicated that US-
LICO expressly aimed its allegedly tortious activities at Texas. Texas was
not the focal point of USLICO's alleged tortious conduct. The court thus
determined that specific jurisdiction was lacking. 84
Nor were there sufficient continuous contacts to demonstrate general ju-
risdiction. The fact that the subsidiaries of USLICO might be subject to the
jurisdiction of a Texas court did not affect USLICO. 85 Indeed, the court
78. Id. at 766.
79. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
80. 851 F.2d at 772.
81. Id.
82. 465 U.S. at 789-90.





observed that USLICO's subsidiaries kept separate books, filed separate in-
come tax returns, were managed by separate boards of directors that had
overlapping but not identical memberships, and were centrally managed by
the officers of the largest subsidiary, not the officers of USLICO.8 6 As a
result, the court did not have jurisdiction over USLICO.8 7
In Bludworth Von Shipyard v. M. V Caribbean Wind 8 8 the Fifth Circuit
emphasized the necessity of strict compliance with the requirements of the
Texas long-arm statute when service on the secretary of state is made.8 9
Finding service improper, the court reversed and remanded the case. 90 In
the trial court, the plaintiff alleged that Westerstrom, who was a resident of
Florida and did not have an office, place of business or agent for service in
Texas, had entered into a contract with the plaintiffs that was to be per-
formed in Texas; the suit arose out of this contract.
Pursuant to rule 4(c)(2)C)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 9 1
plaintiff attempted to serve defendants in accordance with the Texas long-
arm statute, which allows service upon the secretary of state. The plaintiff
served a copy of the citation and petition on the secretary of state, who for-
warded copies by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address al-
leged in the complaint. The citations, however, were each returned
unclaimed. Plaintiff again served the secretary of the state and provided a
different address for the defendants; the post office, again, returned the cita-
tions unopened. The district court entered a default judgment against the
defendants in September, 1984, nine months after the return of the
citations. 92
In April 1986 plaintiff noticed a deposition of Westerstrom in aid of exe-
cution of the judgment. At that time Westerstrom filed both an answer and
a motion to set aside the default judgment. The answer denied that Wester-
strom had entered into a contract with the plaintiff and alleged that any acts
which Westerstrom did were as an agent for a disclosed principal. In the
motion to set aside the default judgment, Westerstrom asserted that the
plaintiff had not served him and that the court therefore lacked personal
jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit considered the issue of personal jurisdiction
properly raised, noting that the defendant concurrently filed the answer and
the motion to set aside the default judgment. Furthermore, the plaintiff had
not raised the issue of possible waiver pursuant to rule 12(h) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 93 The court then held that the district court erred
in denying Westerstrom's motion to set aside the default judgment for lack
of personal jurisdiction, noting that rule 60(b)(4) authorized Westerstrom to
86. Id.
87. Id. at 774.
88. 841 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
89. Id. at 650.
90. Id. at 647.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i) states that a summons and complaint may be served
upon certain defendants pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is held.
92. 841 F.2d at 648.




move for relief of judgment based upon the fact that the judgment was
void. 94
The Fifth Circuit determined that an out-of-date address given to the sec-
retary of state did not meet the requirement of strict compliance with the
Texas long-arm statute authorizing service on the secretary of state, and
therefore, plaintiff did not comply with section 5 of article 2031(b), now
codified in section 17.045(a) of the Civil Practices & Remedies Code.95 The
court further noted only two exceptions to the rule of strict construction
requiring a current address: the first exception is when a company breaches
the duty to maintain a registered office, and the second exception applies in
situations where the defendant attempts to evade service.96 In sum, the
court held that because the plaintiff did not meet the strict requirement of
providing a current address, with the result that service of process never
reached the defendant, the district court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant and the default judgment was void. 97
Considering Westerstrom's amenability to service, the court noted that
the Texas Court of Appeals had recently held that a non-resident is not sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction unless he personally enters into a contract with a
Texas resident. 98 Citing Ross F Meriwether & Associates, Inc. v. Aulbach,99
the Fifth Circuit observed that whenever the non-resident acts as an agent
on behalf of a principal, only the principal does business in the state. 1oo The
Fifth Circuit commented, however, that it need not resolve whether the
Aulbach decision is consistent with the general rule that the Texas long-arm
statute extends to the limits of due process.10' The Fifth Circuit noted that
the district court may well have to determine whether Westerstrom acted
solely as an agent once the plaintiffs properly served him.10 2
B. Texas State Courts
In Runnels v. Firestone 10 3 the court, in the context of a jurisdictional chal-
lenge, addressed the merits of the plaintiff's contract and tort claims. Nancy
Morgan Runnels filed suit against her former husband, David Morgan Fire-
stone, alleging breach of an agreement to pay their son's medical expenses
94. 841 F.2d at 650. Whenever a district court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant be-
cause of lack of service of process, the judgment is void and must be set aside regardless of
whether the movant has a meritorious defense. Id. at 649. See also Peralta v. Heights Medical
Center, 108 S. Ct. 896, 99 L. Ed.2d 75 (1988) (appellant was entitled to have judgment set
aside on ground that he did not receive proper service of process even though he did not have
meritorious defense).
95. 841 F.2d at 650. The court observed that both article 2031(b) and the newly codified
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045(a) (Vernon 1986) would "apparently require a
current address". 841 F.2d at 650 n.9.
96. Id. at 650 n.8.
97. Id. at 650.
98. Id. at 651.
99. 686 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
100. 841 F.2d at 651.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 746 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
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and breach of a statutory duty regarding the same omissions. She con-
tended that her husband had done business in Texas within the meaning of
section 17.042(1) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code by con-
tracting with her to share the burden of David's medical expenses.'0 4
Mr. Firestone had never lived in Texas. He moved to Canada in 1966 and
had been a Canadian citizen since 1971. The son, David, was a Texas resi-
dent, who at the time of the special appearance hearing resided in Maryland
at a treatment center for mental disorders. Firestone filed a special
appearance. 105
The court observed that in order to determine whether long-arm jurisdic-
tion existed pursuant to section 17.042(1), it was necessary for the trial court
to resolve the threshold fact issue of whether the parties had entered into a
contract.' 0 6 The appellate court found that the trial court had impliedly
determined that Firestone had never agreed to reimburse Runnels indefi-
nitely for one-half of David's medical expenses. 10 7 The appellate court fur-
ther found the implied findings well supported in the record. 108 The court
emphasized that in a hearing on a special appearance motion a trial court
should not reach the merits of the case.' 0 9 In actions brought pursuant to
section 17.042, however, the existence of a contract is the purposeful act or
fact on which jurisdiction must be based. Texas courts have, therefore, per-
mitted nonresidents to offer proof that no contract existed even though the
plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving the existence of a contract at a
trial on the merits."10
The court also rejected Runnels' argument that section 423 of the Texas
Probate Code established a legal duty to supply support to David, which
Firestone allegedly breached."' the court determined that, as a matter of
law, Firestone's failure to pay David's medical expenses did not amount to
negligence per se in violation of section 423, which sets up a hierarchy of
family financial responsibility for an incompetent's maintenance." 12 Having
104. Runnels actually relied upon the doing business clause of former Article 2031(b), now
codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986).
105. In assessing Mr. Firestone's special appearance, the court followed the three prong
test set forth in O'Brien v. Lampar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966), the first prong of
which requires the non-resident to have purposefully performed some act in Texas. The court
commented that since only the second prong of the O'Brien test was at issue in Hall v.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S.
408 (1984), the Supreme Court's reversal of Hall does not remove the requirement that prong
one of the test is a threshold jurisdictional requirement when a plaintiff asserting jurisdiction
relies on specific subsections of § 17.042 of the TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE (Vernon 1986).
106. 746 S.W.2d at 849. The court treated Ms. Runnels' argument on appeal as a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court. Because the trial court had not
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, the appellate court could infer findings neces-
sary to sustain the trial court's decision to deny jurisdiction under § 17.042(1) and uphold that
decision under any legal theory which the evidence supported. 746 S.W.2d at 849-50.




111. Id. at 852. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 423 (Vernon 1980).
112. 746 S.W.2d at 852.
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established that the purposeful act that Runnels asserted was not a tort
under Texas law, the court affirmed the trial court's granting of the special
appearance.113 The Runnels case provides a good example of a court's
threshold merits determination of the existence of a contract or tort before
resolving the jurisdictional issue.
McFee v. Chevron International Oil Co., Inc. 114 was one of several cases
during the Survey period that considered the imputation of a subsidiary's
contacts to a parent company, or vice versa. Plaintiffs, British subjects,
brought suit in Harris County, Texas, against several defendants based upon
their claim that the defendants' gross negligence caused the death of their
son, Andy McFee, who was killed by political rebels in the Sudan. Seiscom
Delta, Chevron Corporation (the parent company), Chevron Oil Co. of Su-
dan, Chevron Overseas Petroleum, Inc., Chevron Petroleum (U.K.), Ltd.
and three other related corporations, including Chevron U.S.A., were named
as defendants. The district court granted appellees' special appearances and
dismissed the claims against Chevron Corporation, Chevron Oil Company
of Sudan, Chevron Overseas Petroleum, Inc. and Chevron Petroleum
(U.K.), Ltd. based on lack of personal jurisdiction. 1 5 The court then
granted summary judgments in favor of the three related corporations, in-
cluding Chevron U.S.A., and it stayed the claims against Seiscom Delta due
to bankruptcy.' 16
On appeal, the McFees challenged the trial court's granting of the special
appearances. The McFees argued that Chevron U.S.A.'s business activities
in Texas could be imputed to the parent corporation, Chevron Corporation,
and in turn, to the other appellees. The facts revealed that Chevron Corpo-
ration owned 100% of the shares of three other Chevron appellees, including
Chevron U.S.A. Further, all of the revenues of Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan
flow back to the parent company, and its expenses were paid directly or
indirectly by the parent company. The boards of directors of the various
Chevron subsidiaries overlapped, and payroll for the subsidiaries came out
of the central payroll in San Francisco, California, the location of the parent
corporation. Officials of Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan, Chevron Overseas Pe-
troleum, Inc. and the parent, Chevron Corporation, shared security informa-
tion, including decision-making about safety in Sudan. The court decided
that the relationships between Chevron U.S.A. and the parent corporation
Chevron Corporation and the relationship between Chevron U.S.A. and its
sibling subsidiary corporations, Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan, Chevron Over-
seas Petroleum, Inc. and Chevron Petroleum (U.K.), Ltd. were too attenu-
ated to support personal jurisdiction. 1 7
None of the four appellees was incorporated in Texas, had an office in
Texas or was qualified to do business in Texas. The appellants nonetheless
113. Id. at 853.
114. 753 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
115. Id. at 470.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 472.
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argued that under the O'Brien test"I8 Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan did several
acts in Texas that related directly to McFee's death. First, they argued that
Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan contracted with Seiscom Delta, a Texas company,
for the performance of seismic work in Sudan. Second, they asserted that
the contract was partly performed in Texas because logistical support,
purchasing, shipping and management personnel services for the contract
were handled in Houston, Texas.
The court noted, however, that Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan and United
Geophysical Corporation, a Delaware corporation acquired in 1981 by Seis-
com Delta, executed the original contract for the performance of seismic
work in Sudan in 1976.119 They negotiated the contract in Khartoum, Su-
dan and San Francisco, California. The McFees presented no evidence or
testimony that when Chevron Oil Co. of Sudan entered into the contract
with United Geophysical, a California corporation, it could have foreseen
that three years later United Geophysical would be purchased by Seiscom
Delta, a Texas company. As a result there was no intent by Chevron Oil Co.
of Sudan to do business in Texas and, consequently, no personal
jurisdiction. 120
Onda Enterprises v. The Honorable Jack Pierce 121 emphasizes the recur-
ring problem of the erroneous use of a motion to quash rather than a special
appearance. Onda Enterprises, a Japanese corporation, chose to contest ser-
vice of process in the trial court by filing a motion to quash the service of
process, followed by a motion to dismiss the action on the basis of lack of
personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to quash and de-
nied the motion to dismiss. 122 The plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a
118. The Supreme Court of Texas in O'Brien v. Lampar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966),
stated the three requirements for exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation:
1. The non-resident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do
some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
2. The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or
transaction; and
3. The assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given
to the quality, nature and extent of activity in the forum state, the relative
convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws the fo-
rum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the
situation.
Id. at 342.
119. 753 S.W.2d at 470.
120. Id. at 473. The appellants also argued that the appellees conspired with the other
defendants to hide the dangerous working situation in Sudan from the employees. The court
held that the appellants did not meet the threshold requirement of showing a conspiracy in
connecting the acts of the resident conspirators with those of nonresident conspirators. Id.
The managing director of Chevron of Sudan provided the only evidence of conspiracy when he
testified that security information and decision-making concerning safety and operations in the
Sudan was shared by officials of the parent corporation and two of its subsidiaries. The ulti-
mate decision to leave or withdraw employees would have been made by Seiscom's top man-
agement in Houston. The court determined that the evidence did not signify either a
conspiracy or a connection between the acts of Seiscom and the appellees. Id. As a result, the
court affirmed the judgment granting appellees' special appearances. Id.
121. 750 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
122. Id. at 813.
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petition for writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the court of appeals to set
aside the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss. The appellate
court concluded that mandamus was not proper. 123 The plaintiff had made
the mistake of filing a motion to quash rather than a special appearance and
thus became subject to the court's jurisdiction. The court admonished that
the plaintiff should have filed a special appearance under rule 120a of the
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure124 to avoid a general appearance. 25 Cer-
tainly, mandamus was not proper.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Contracts
The Survey period's most noteworthy and precedential Texas conflicts
case is DeSantis v. Wackenhut,126 in which the Texas Supreme Court tenta-
tively held that Florida law could not be applied to uphold a noncompete
agreement as such clauses are strictly governed under Texas law as a matter
of public policy. 127 Wackenhut, a Florida-based corporation specializing in
furnishing security guards, hired Edward DeSantis to manage its Houston
office in 1981. DeSantis had fourteen years' experience at the time he took
the job. Their contract included a clause calling for the application of Flor-
ida law to any disputes over the contract.
By 1984 the employment relationship had broken down. DeSantis
claimed that Wackenhut had promised him increased opportunity after
spending one year learning the Houston operation. Wackenhut denied this.
DeSantis then resigned in March, 1984, claiming that Wackenhut forced
him out after a dispute with company headquarters over the Houston office's
profitability. Wackenhut claimed it fired DeSantis over unethical business
solicitations.
After leaving Wackenhut, DeSantis invested in a company that marketed
security electronics and formed Risk Deterrence, Inc. ("RDI"), which pro-
vided consulting services and security guards. In April 1984, DeSantis sent
out letters promoting his new businesses to "twenty to thirty" companies,
including Wackenhut clients. The letter included DeSantis's disclaimer of
any intent to interfere with Wackenhut's business. Wackenhut soon lost two
clients to DeSantis, and sued him for injunctive relief and monetary damages
for breaching the noncompete clause. DeSantis counterclaimed for fraud
and tortious interference, wrongful injunction, and a claim under the Texas
Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. 128
The trial court upheld the noncompete clause, but reduced the area of
noncompetition from forty counties to thirteen counties surrounding Hous-
123. Id. at 814.
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
125. 750 S.W.2d at 814.
126. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. 616 (July 13, 1988).
127. Id. at 619. The July 13, 1988, opinion is not final. The supreme court has not yet
ruled on Wackenhut's motion for rehearing. See note 137, infra.
128. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.01 (Vernon 1987).
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ton, and reduced the time to two years. 129 The court then enjoined RDI
from disclosing any of Wackenhut's confidential or proprietary information
and from hiring DeSantis for two years.' 30 The trial court denied all of
DeSantis's counterclaims, and the court of appeals affirmed on all counts.13'
The supreme court reversed on the key points. 132 First, the court held
that the parties contractual choice of Florida law was unenforceable in Texas
because of Texas' strongly supported policies regarding noncompete agree-
ments.' 33 In so holding, the court traced Texas law concerning the enforce-
ment of choice of law clauses. 134 The court found that Texas statutory and
case law provided that express choice of law agreements were to be given
effect (1) if the contract bears a reasonable relationship to the chosen state,
and (2) if no countervailing Texas policy demands otherwise. 35 The court
noted that this test for choice of law agreements was substantially the same
as that found in Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. 136 The court then adopted section 187 to govern contractual choice
of law clauses in Texas. 137 In spite of the court's adoption of section 187,
readers should recall the additional choice of law requirements for contracts
governed by the Texas Business and Commerce Code.' 38 Those contracts
should use bold print for choice of law even if Texas law is not the substan-
tive law chosen or ultimately applied.
In holding Florida law inapplicable, the court also provided a definitive
reading on public policy as a grounds for denying the application of a sister
state's law. 139 The court cited to section 187 of the Restatement (Second)




133. Id. at 620. Texas places substantial restrictions on the reinforcement of non-compete
agreements as a matter of fundamental policy. Id.
134. Id. at 617-18.
135. Id. at 618.
136. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1981). The supreme
court erred in equating RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 187 with Texas common law regarding
choice of law agreements. Although Texas law requires that the parties' chosen law consistent
with Texas public policy, section 187 does not address forum public policy. Rather, section
187 requires that the parties' chosen law not be contrary too "a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater interest than the [parties'] chosen state in the determination of
the particular issue, and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice by the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (emphasis added). Section 188 is the general choice of law rule for
contracts without valid choice of law agreements. While the factors of § 188 may point to
Texas law as the appropriate choice of law for the Wackenhut dispute (thus vindicating the
court's results, but not its reasoning), the court nonetheless erred to the extent it perceived
section 187 as requiring the parties' chosen law to be compatible with forum policy. The court
erred further in ignoring section 187's requirement that the parties' chosen law be displaced
only by the law of a state with a materially greater interest. Although forum policy is a factor
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6's most significant relationship test, forum policy is not
preemptive. Dallas attorney James Wallenstein agreed to these points in an amicus brief filed
in Wackenhut. The court will presumably address these points in ruling on the Motion for
Rehearing. Author's conversation with James Wallenstein, April 26, 1989.
137. Id.
138. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 35.53 (Vernon 1987).
139. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 618-19.
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and the seminal Gutierrez v. Collins case,'4 and noted that the forum could
not reject another law on public policy grounds merely because a different
result would obtain.1 4 1 Rather, the other state's law must "differ in such a
way as to directly impinge upon rights created in support of a fundamental
policy of the State of Texas."' 142
The supreme court upheld the lower courts' dismissal for lack of evidence
of DeSantis's counterclaims of fraud and tortious interference.143 The court
reversed, however, as to violations of the Texas Free Enterprise and Anti-
trust Act,144 finding that Wackenhut's actions had violated the Act.' 45 De-
Santis was thus entitled to costs and attorney fees, but not to treble damages
as he had shown no damages. 146 DeSantis is noteworthy for its clear man-
date that Texas law will govern noncompete agreements in Texas, and for
the adoption of yet another Section in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws. Readers should note, however, that the DeSantis opinion may be
revised. 147
American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Products Co. 148 considers
the applicability and constitutionality of article 21.42 of the Texas Insurance
Code. 149 The court's analysis is the most thorough of any choice of law
opinion this year, but reaches a questionable conclusion. In American Home
the plaintiff insurers brought a declaratory action for a finding that their
insurance policies did not cover punitive damages. The trial court applied
Texas law and found that the policies did cover punitive damages.150 The
court of appeals agreed' 5' under the following analysis.
The insurers' declaratory action involved two underlying Texas cases: a
140. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
141. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 618.
142. Id. The court further quoted from § 187 that i[t]o be 'fundamental,' a policy must
...be a substantial one. . . . [A] fundamental policy may be embodied in a statute which
makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal or which is designed to protect a person against
the oppressive use of bargaining power." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 187 comment g (1971). The court then drew from a 1967 case enforcing a Mexi-
can lottery ticket for $40,000. Id. (citing Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967)).
The court of civil appeals in Castilleja had held the agreement unenforceable as against public
policy. The supreme court in that case then reversed, describing the public policy exception
as:
To justify a court in refusing to enforce a right of action which accrued under
the laws of another state, because against the policy of our laws, it must appear
that it is against good morals or natural justice, or that for some other reason
the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the general interest of our own
citizens.
Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. 1967). Castilleja did not involve a contractual
choice of law, but the court felt it appropriate as to the requirements for public policy to
override an otherwise controlling foreign law.
143. 31 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 621-22.
144. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1987).
145. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 621.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 127.
148. 743 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
149. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).




1973 action against Rawlings Sporting Goods Company for failure to warn
about their football helmets' limited protection, 152 and a 1977 action against
Safety Steel Products for a defective scaffold. 153 The insured parties received
punitive damages in each case. The insurers then brought the declaratory
action to avoid paying punitive damages. The geographical contacts were as
follows: in the Rawlings case, the insurer was a New York corporation with
New York as its principal place of business; Rawlings had its principal place
of business in Missouri; the parties negotiated the policy between Missouri
and New York, the policy was issued in New York and countersigned in
Missouri; the premiums were payable in New York through Rawlings' Ohio
agent; and the insurer's last affirmative act occurred in New York.' 5 4 In the
Safeway case, the insurer was a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal
place of business in New York; Safeway's principal place of business was
Wisconsin; the premiums were payable in New York; and the last affirmative
act by the insurer was in New York. 155
The Texas contacts in both cases were based upon the underlying personal
injury cases. The two injured parties were both Texas residents, who suf-
fered injuries and filed their lawsuits in Texas. The injured parties, however,
were fully paid their punitive damages prior to the insurer's declaratory ac-
tion. The court thus focused on the actual awarding of the contested puni-
tive damages in Texas. 156
In its choice of law analysis, the court first noted that Texas had a statu-
tory choice of law rule, thus obviating the application of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, as requested by the insurers.157 Article 21.42
of the Texas Insurance Code' 58 required the application of Texas law in this
case apparently because of the prior punitive damages awards from Texas
courts. It could be argued that article 21.42 did not apply since the insur-
ance was not payable directly to the injured parties, but instead to Rawlings
and Safeway, neither of whom was a Texas citizen or inhabitant as required
by article 21.42. The policies were not payable to Texas citizens or inhabit-
ants since Rawlings and Safeway already paid the insured parties by the time
of the action. As if in response to this criticism, the court argued the appli-
cability of Texas law under the Second Restatement's choice of law rules and
the Constitution. 159
First addressing the constitutional issues, the court noted that article
21.42 had been upheld as constitutional.1 60 The court determined that the
152. Id.
153. Id. at 695-96.
154. Id. at 696.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 699.
157. Id. at 697.
158. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).
159. 743 S.W.2d 697-700.
160. Id. at 697. The court cited Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. 432
S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1968); and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924) for the point




contacts with Texas in this case also supported the constitutionality of ap-
plying Texas law under Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.16 1 The court then
employed an interest analysis to support its findings.' 62
The court next considered false conflicts. 63 The court found that the only
true conflict was between Texas law and Missouri law, since Wisconsin law
was identical to Texas, and New York refused to consider the issue on public
policy grounds. 64 The court's labeling of New York law as a false conflict
was confusing. If New York refused to enforce insurance contracts for puni-
tive damages, then it is contrary to Texas law, which would enforce such
contracts. The court concluded this was a false conflict by focusing on New
York's refusal to interpret such contracts. 65
Narrowing the analysis to Texas and Missouri (and thus limiting the case
at this point to the Rawlings matter), the court found Texas's interests were
greater than Missouri's because Texas courts imposed the punitive dam-
ages. 166 Thus the court held that the Missouri contacts (Rawlings's home
and the place where the policy was countersigned) were less important, not
on the issue of personal injury liability to Texas residents, but on the issue of
interpreting a contract between New York and Missouri parties.' 67 The re-
sult of applying Texas law over Missouri law is particularly troubling when
one considers that both Missouri and New York-the homes of the two con-
tracting parties-would have held the punitive damages to be outside the
insurance contract.
The court got around this troubling aspect by arguing that it had to apply
Texas law-as the state in which the punitives were awarded-so as to pre-
vent forum shopping. 6 8 That is, if the court applied any state's law other
than the one awarding the punitive damages, then the insurer could merely
seek the most favorable state after the conclusion of the liability trial. This
argument confuses forum shopping with choice of law. Even though forum
shopping is likely to result in the application of a favorable forum law, it
does not guarantee it. In fact, the insurers here did the opposite. The insur-
ers came to Texas asking that Texas law not be applied. The court imposed
Texas law arguing that it did so to discourage forum shopping, while ironi-
cally encouraging forum shopping in the future.' 69 Had American Home
gone to either Missouri or New York courts, it would have avoided punative
damages, unless the Missouri or New York court chose to apply Texas
law-an unlikely result since the sole question was the interpretation of a
contract between Missouri and New York parties.
American Home is reminiscent of Justice Powell's concurrence in Allstate
161. 743 S.W.2d at 697 (citing 449 U.S. 302 (1981)).
162. 743 S.W.2d at 697-99.
163. Id. at 698-99.
164. Id. at 699.
165. Id. at 698.
166. Id.





v. Hague.'7 0 In Allstate Justice Powell found the Minnesota court's applica-
tion of Minnesota law constitutionally sound but nevertheless a bad choice
of law decision.17 ' Texas may have the necessary constitutionally minimal
connection to the Rawlings matter to apply Texas law, but American Home
is a questionable choice of law analysis for applying Texas law to interpret a
contract between New York and Missouri parties.
American International Trading Corporation v. Petroleos Mexicanos 72
held that a party could not argue for the first time on appeal that the trial
court should have applied a different law.' 7 3 The case concerned American
International's action against Petroleos Mexicanos ("Pemex") for breach of
contract for the purchase of 105,000 tons of barite. Pemex placed the order
for the barite in September 1981. Pemex contended that in a later meeting,
in October 1981, it renegotiated for 50,000 tons instead of 105,000 tons.
American International disagreed and sued for Pemex's failure to schedule
delivery of the 105,000 tons. Neither party raised choice of law at trial, and
the federal district court in Houston applied Texas law.' 74 On appeal,
Pemex argued for Mexican law, claiming that resolving the case under Texas
law resulted in a manifest injustice, and alternatively, that Texas choice of
law rules called for Mexican law.' 75 The Fifth Circuit held that Pemex
failed to show a manifest injustice. 7 6 The court explained that showing that
a different result would obtain under Mexican law was not a manifest injus-
tice. 177 The appellate court did not address the question of which law Texas
choice of law rules would apply, finding instead that Pemex could not argue
Mexican law on appeal because it failed to raise the issue at trial.' 7
In InterFirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez'79 the Fifth Circuit upheld a
Texas choice of law agreement between a Texas bank and a Louisiana bor-
rower.' 80 The debtor argued against the application of Texas law on the
grounds that only the loan agreement included the choice of law clause, not
the Louisiana security agreement. The court pointed out that the debtor,
Fernandez, also signed a Texas security agreement and then agreed to Texas
foreclosure procedures in a letter.' 8 ' The court held that these facts, taken
with the choice of law clause in the loan agreement, sufficiently evidenced
the parties' intention to be bound by Texas law.' 8 2 The court thus held that
the security agreement had an implied choice of Texas law, supported by the
170. 449 U.S. (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). Id. at 332-40.
171. Id.
172. 835 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1987).
173. Id. at 540.
174. Id. at 538, 540.




179. 844 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. aff'd on rehearing), 853 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1988). The entire
opinion on all issues appears in the former citation. The latter opinion only addresses super-
seding choice of law.
180. Id. at 382.




express choice of Texas law in the loan agreement and other communica-
tions between the parties.'8 3
Fernandez also challenged the application of Texas law on two other
grounds. He argued that the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act, 8 4 which
had an unwaivable requirement that a deficiency judgment be based on a
judicial sale with appraisement, precluded the parties choice of Texas law. 8 5
The Fifth Circuit found, however, that the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment
Act did not apply because the parties had chosen Texas law in their con-
tract, and because Texas choice of law rules (binding on federal courts)
honored that choice of law clause.' 86
Fernandez next argued that Texas choice of law rules were precluded by a
federal choice of law rule. Fernandez urged that section 506 of the Federal
Aviation Act' 87 required the application of the law where delivery of the
security instrument took place-in this case, Louisiana. The court found,
however, that section 506 applied only to issues of substantive validity, such
as the sufficiency of consideration for the underlying contract.' 88 Foreclo-
sure proceedings did not constitute matters of substantive validity, the court
reasoned, and section 506 was therefore inapplicable. 189 Thus, the parties'
choice of Texas law survived Fernandez's three-part assault.
B. Torts
Coakes v. Arabian American Oil Company19 was a British citi-
zen/resident's action for misrepresentation and breach of employment con-
tract. Coakes alleged that Aramco misled him as to the legality of the
making and drinking of alcohol in Saudi Arabia. ' 9' Coakes had interviewed
with an employment agency in England and then with Aramco in the
Netherlands. He signed his employment contract in London in 1973 and
moved with his wife to Saudi Arabia to assume his job. Coakes and his wife
lived on the Aramco compound in Saudi Arabia. In 1983 Saudi authorities
arrested him and imprisoned him for the illegal manufacture and sale of
alcohol. The country deported him in 1984, and in 1987 he filed this action
in a Houston federal court. Neither Coakes nor his wife had ever been to the
United States. The district court held that English law governed and that
the case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, with the
condition that plaintiff had 120 days to refile in England. 192
The Fifth Circuit upheld both the choice of law and the forum non con-
183. Id. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) provides that
both express and implied choice of law agreements should be honored.
184. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4106-4108 (West 1968).
185. Id. § 13:4106.
186. 853 F.2d at 294.
187. 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976).
188. 853 F.2d at 295.
189. Id.
190. 831 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1987).
191. Id. at 573.
192. Id. at 574.
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veniens dismissal. 193 It is unclear, however, why the trial and appellate
courts found it necessary to engage in a choice of law analysis prior to dis-
missing the case. Because Aramco filed the forum non conveniens objection
as part of its original answer, the choice of law analysis appears unnecessary.
The court went through such an analysis, however, and found that the
United States had only a minimal interest in the controversy. 194 Although
Aramco was a Texas-based corporation, all pertinent contacts were made in
England, the Netherlands, or Saudi Arabia. 195
Coakes presented two further arguments for retaining the case in the dis-
trict court. First, thirteen of his witnesses were in the United States, requir-
ing greater expense for transporting them to England to testify.
Sympathizing with this argument, the district court made special provisions
for discovery prior to the dismissal. 196 The Fifth Circuit also noted a solici-
tor's affidavit from England stating that the American-made depositions
might not be admissible in English courts. 197 The affidavit, however, did not
persuade the court that this compelled retention of the case because of the
similar testimony available from witnesses in England. 98 The second argu-
ment was that plaintiff's litigation burden would be increased in England
because of the absence there of a contingent fee system. This, too, provided
insufficient grounds to retain the case. 199
Crisman v. Cooper Industries2° ° concerned a wrongful death action
against a Houston-based company for an automobile-related death in Flor-
ida. The Texas trial court applied Florida law and dismissed the action
under Florida's statute of repose, 20 1 which requires all actions for products
liability to be brought within twelve years of manufacture. 20 2 The alleged
193. Id. at 576. The court's choice of law analysis appears both thorough and correct.
There is no indication, however, that the court actually considered the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS' most significant relationship test, as required by Texas law. See
Duncan v. Cessna, 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984). The court did not mention either § 6 of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (detailing the seven factors of the most
significant relationship test) or any of the specific tort or contract choice of law sections, such
as §§ 145 and 188. The court did consider several of the factors from §§ 6, 145 and 188, such
as the place of the negotiation, the place of performance, the place of injury, and the interests
of the respective states. 831 F.2d at 575-76. But it omitted other pertinent considerations such
as the parties' expectations, the policies (as opposed to the interests) of England and the United
States, and the needs of the International legal system. These may not have changed the out-
come, and are not necessarily worthy of mention. But it would be reassuring to know that the
court did consult the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS for this otherwise
valid analysis.
Another interesting point is the court's making a choice between English law and United
States law. Id. at 575. Plaintiff was interested in having Texas law applied, since his claim was
for fraud, breach of contract, loss of consortium and mental anguish. For these purposes,
Texas is a "state" comparable to England in the choice of law analysis.
194. 831 F.2d at 574.
195. Id. at 573-74.
196. Id. at 574-75.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 575-76.
200. 748 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
201. Id. at 280-82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West 1982).
202. 748 S.W.2d at 275-76, 280 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West 1982).
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defective product was a trailer, manufactured in Illinois and originally sold
in Florida in March 1963. The accident occurred in 1984, at which time a
Florida corporation owned the trailer and a Florida resident pulled the
trailer behind his pickup truck. The accident occurred at night, allegedly as
a result of the trailer's lack of stop lights, brake lights, turn signals or license
plate lights.20 3
The deceased was from Tennessee and her husband, the plaintiff, still lived
in Tennessee at the time of the action. The manufacturer was an Ohio cor-
poration whose trailer subsidiary had its principal place of business in Texas.
The trailer's owner and the truck driver were not parties to the action.2°4
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's choice and application of
Florida law.20 5 First, the court held that the Texas choice of law rules-the
most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws-called for Florida law.20 6 The court examined the seven factors of
the most significant relationship test in section 6 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) along with section 145, the general tort principle.20 7 Under the various
factors, the court concluded that the Florida accident situs took precedence
over the manufacturer's location in Texas, particularly because nothing had
occurred in Texas relative to the design or manufacture of the trailer. 208
The analysis included a review of the respective policies of Texas and
Florida. The court found that Texas had no overriding interest since noth-
ing related to the trailer's manufacture had occurred in Texas.2°9 Florida,
on the other hand, seemed to have a strong interest in applying its statute of
repose, since that law specifically pertained to products liability, and because
the trailer was in the Florida stream of commerce. 210
Plaintiff also argued that Florida had amended its statute of repose and
that the current version should apply; alternatively, he asserted that the stat-
ute of repose was procedural. The court of appeals disagreed with both con-
tentions.21' Finally, plaintiff maintained that the statute of repose violated
the Texas constitution's open courts guarantee. The court of appeals dis-
missed this by noting that because Florida law controlled, the Texas consti-
tution did not apply. 212
In Dorety v. Avondale Shipyards2 13 a federal district court applied a fed-
eral choice of law rule. The case involved plaintiff's October 23, 1979 injury
on an offshore drilling rig. On October 21, 1981 plaintiff sued Avondale,
who was not her employer, on a personal injury claim. 214 The trial granted
203. 748 S.W.2d at 275.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 278-82.
206. Id. at 278.
207. Id. at 278-79.
208. Id. at 279.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 280-81.
212. Id. at 282.
213. 672 F. Supp. 962, 963 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
214. Id.
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Avondale's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act2' 5 called for the statute of limitations of the
adjacent state.216 Louisiana, the adjacent state, had a one year limitation
period for personal injury suits. 2 17 Plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act2 18 should apply, but
the court disagreed because the Longshoremen Act applied only to actions
against employers, and Avondale was not her employer.219
McClure v. Duggan 220 illustrates the application of depecage, or the use of
two or more states' laws in a single case, as called for by Duncan v.
Cessna.2 2 ' In McClure a Texas buyer sued a California racehorse seller for
breach of oral agreements, fraud, deceptive trade practices, conversion and
breach of fiduciary duty.2 2 2 The federal district court held that section 188
of the Restatement (Second),22 3 which called for California law, governed
the contract claims because of the overwhelming contacts with California.22 4
Texas law, however, governed the deceptive trade practice claims for several
reasons. First, the parties pleaded only Texas law on this issue.2 25 Second,
the court found that Texas public policy mandated the application of Texas
law.22 6 The court's analysis here is unclear. This author is unaware of any
mandate under the Texas DTPA that would preclude the application of an-
other state's consumer law. The point is not capable of analysis in this case
because the parties did not plead any other law on the deceptive trade prac-
tice issues. The court noted a false conflict between Texas and California on
the fraud claim, and it applied Texas law to the conversion and breach of
fiduciary duty claims without a choice of law discussion.2 27
C. Other Cases
The United States Supreme Court offered the most important choice of
law case in the Survey period involving the equitable duty to pay interest on
mineral royalties. Sun Oil Company v. Wortman228 is factually similar to
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 2 2 9 which was decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1985. Both cases involved gas royalty owners class ac-
tions to compel interest on royalty payments that were temporarily withheld
pending governmental approval of price increases. Sun Oil's proposed price
increases had to be approved by the Federal Power Commission, but pend-
215. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1986).
216. 672 F. Supp. at 963.
217. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3536 (West 1953).
218. 33 U.S.C. §§ 903-905 (1986).
219. 672 F. Supp. at 963.
220. 674 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Tex.. 1987).
221. 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
222. 674 F. Supp. at 213-14.
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
224. 674 F. Supp. at 215-16.
225. Id. at 219 n.2.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 108 S. Ct. 2117, 100 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1988).
229. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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ing such approval, Sun Oil could charge consumers the proposed higher
price. Sun Oil was also permitted to withhold from the royalty owners the
royalty on the increased prices until the increases were approved. The inter-
est issue was not addressed in these cases. 230
In July 1976, and again in April 1978, Sun Oil paid the royalty owners
their royalty payments based on prior price increases but did not pay any
interest. In August 1979, Richard Wortman and Hazel Moore filed a class
action in Kansas state court seeking interest on those royalty increases for
the period that Sun withheld the money awaiting the price increase ap-
proval. The affected properties were located in Texas, Oklahoma and Loui-
siana. The laws of these states did not clearly require interest, and if those
states required interest, the rates were lower than that of Kansas.
The trial court ruled that Kansas law applied to all claims, even those
claims for mineral properties in other states owned by residents of other
states.231 Under Kansas law, the court ruled that class members were enti-
tled to interest on the withheld royalties at the same rates that would have
been paid to consumers if the price increase had been disapproved. 232 The
trial court based this ruling on the Kansas Supreme Court's holding in
Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum (Shutts 1),233 which the Kansas Supreme Court
reaffirmed in Shutts H1234 and Wortman v. Sun Oil Co. (Wortman 1).235 The
losing gas companies in Shutts II and Wortman I petitioned the United
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 236 The Supreme Court re-
versed Shutts II insofar as the Kansas court had applied Kansas law to non-
Kansas claims and remanded both Shuts II and Wortman I to the lower
courts for further consideration under the appropriate states' laws. 237
On remand, the Wortman trial court (Wortman II) held that Texas,
Oklahoma and Louisiana laws reached the same results as Kansas law, re-
quiring royalty interest at the same rate due consumers under federal regula-
tions.238 The trial court further held that nothing in Shutts 111 (the Supreme
Court's decision) 239 prevented the application of Kansas' five year limitation
period, thus validating royalty owners' claims on royalty payments made in
1976.240 The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the first of these findings in
Shutts IV 24 I and upheld both findings in Wortman 111.242
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on Wortman III on
two questions: (1) Does an alleged misapplication of other states' laws vio-
230. 108 S. Ct. at 2120-21, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 751.
231. Id. at 2120, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 751.
232. Id. at 2120, 1006 Ed. at 751.
233. 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 1068 (1978).
234. 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984).
235. 236 Kan. 266, 690 P.2d 385 (1984).
236. 108 S. Ct. at 2121, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 751.
237. Id. at 1221, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 751-52.
238. Id. at 2121, 100 L. Ed. at 752.
239. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
240. 108 S. Ct. at 2121, 100 L. Ed.2d at 752.
241. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 240 Kan. 764, 732 P.2d 1286 (1987).
242. 241 Kan. 226, 734 P.2d 1190 (1987).
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late the Constitution? (2) Does the forum's application of its own statute of
limitation violate the Constitution?243 The Supreme Court upheld the Kan-
sas decision on both counts.244 Addressing the statute of limitation question
first, Justice Scalia found that neither full faith and credit nor due process
prevented Kansas from applying its own statute of limitations.24 5 The Court
cited an 1839 case, M'Elmoyle v. Cohen,246 along with other cases 247 for the
proposition that statutes of limitation are procedural and thus governed by
forum law regardless of which state's substantive law governs. 248 According
to Justice Scalia, this was the law at the time the Fourteenth amendment was
adopted and there was no indication that it had changed. 249 Sun Oil dis-
agreed, citing Guaranty Trust Company v. York 250 for the point that statutes
of limitation are substantive law in Erie cases. 251 The majority rejected this,
concluding that what is substantive for Erie purposes is not necessarily sub-
stantive for choice of law purposes.252 As for due process preventing the
application of the Kansas statute of limitation, the majority again concluded
that neither the practice at the time of the Fourteenth amendment's adop-
tion nor the succeeding developments prevented the Kansas court's practice
in this case. 253
The majority then turned to Sun Oil's argument that full faith and credit
and due process required Kansas to apply other states' laws correctly. The
Court first noted that the mere misconstruction of another state's law did
not violate the Constitution.254 A violation occurred only if the miscon-
struction violated clearly established laws that had been recognized by the
Court. 25 5 The Court examined the laws of Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana
and found that Kansas's implementation of those laws was not a clear con-
tradiction of those laws. 256
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, filed a well-reasoned
dissent. 257 O'Connor concurred in the finding on the limitations question,
but she noted that if Texas, Oklahoma or Louisiana had regarded their own
limitation periods as substantive, then the result should be different. 258
O'Connor thus disapproved with the majority's reasoning, but concurred in
243. 108 S. Ct. at 2120-21, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 750-52.
244. Id. at 2128, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 760.
245. Id. at 2121-25, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 752-75.
246. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
247. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 407 (1850).
248. 108 S. Ct. at 2122, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 753.
249. Id. at 2122-23, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 753-55.
250. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
251. The Erie doctrine is taken from Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), land
dictates choice of law for federal/state conflicts of law in federal diversity cases.
252. 108 S. Ct. at 2124-26, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 755-57.
253. Id. at 2126, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 757.
254. Id., 100 L. Ed. 2d at 758.
255. Id., 100 L. Ed. 2d at 758.
256. Id. at 2126-28, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 758-60.
257. Id. at 2133, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 766.
258. Id., 100 L. Ed. 2d at 766.
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the result. 259 On the question of the constitutionality of misconstruing other
states' laws, O'Connor and Rehnquist dissented vigorously.26° Attacking
both the Kansas Supreme Court's analysis of the other states' laws and the
majority's reasoning in upholding the Kansas decision, the dissent con-
cluded that the Sun Oil opinion omitted key sections of Shutts III and ig-
nored the full faith and credit clause.261 Sun Oil upholds the Supreme
Court's long tradition of reluctance to interfere with state court choice of
law processes. The two-justice dissent, reflecting more current thinking on
choice of law, will not likely move the Court in the near future.
In Richardson v. State262 the unusual instance of choice of law in a crimi-
nal case arose. Facing murder charges, defendant Richardson sought to pre-
clude the crucial testimony of his alleged common law wife, who had seen
the bodies of Richardson's victims immediately after the shooting. Their
alleged marriage occurred in Oklahoma; therefore, Oklahoma law deter-
mined its validity. 263 The court noted, however, that while Oklahoma law
governed the marriage's validity, Texas law governed the procedural issue of
who had the burden of proving the marriage. 264 Plaintiff had the burden
and failed to meet it, thus allowing the testimony against him.265
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments create conflicts of laws in two ways: the local enforce-
ment of foreign judgments, and the preclusive effect of foreign lawsuits on
local lawsuits. The 1988 Survey period offered no significant developments
for either enforcement or preclusion. Three 1988 cases, however, illustrate
noteworthy points for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
In Strick Lease, Inc. v. Cutler266 the El Paso Court of Appeals upheld the
stay of execution of a Pennsylvania judgment that had been entered by con-
fession. 267 Pennsylvania law authorizes clerks to enter judgment after an
attorney of a court of record confesses a defaulting debtor to judgment in
accordance with the parties' prior contractual agreement. .268 The plaintiff's
attorney signed the confession as "Attorney for the Defendant," which is
authorized under Pennsylvania law.269 The Pennsylvania court subse-
quently entered judgment against the defendant.270 The Texas court, how-
ever, held that the Pennsylvania judgment was void for want of
jurisdiction. 271 The court emphasized that the debtors' attorney did not sign
259. 108 S. Ct. at 2133-36, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 766-70.
260. Id. 108 S. Ct. at 2133-36, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 766-70.
261. Id. 108 S. Ct. at 2133-36, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 766-70.
262. 744 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
263. Id. at 73.
264. Id. at 73-74.
265. Id.
266. 759 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 777.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 778.
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the confession, which it held to be a necessary step to acquire personal
jurisdiction. 272
Citicorp Real Estate v. Banque Arabe Internationale D'Investissement 273 is
instructive on the point that merely filing a foreign judgment with the clerk's
office pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
(UEFJA) does not create a judgment lien. In Citicorp Interwest and Banque
Arabe, two creditors of the late Clint Murchison, abstracted their foreign
judgments omitting Murchison's address and the manner of citation. 274 In a
dispute concerning the validity of these judgments, the district court found
that they were all valid judicial liens. 275 Citicorp, one of the competing cred-
itors for the dwindling Murchison estate, however, contended that Interwest
and Banque Arabe substantially failed to comply with the Texas Property
Code.276 The court of appeals agreed with Citicorp and concluded that the
UEFJA required a foreign judgment creditor to comply with statutory lien
requirements just as a Texas judgment creditor would. 277
In Gaston v. Chaney 278 a Texas court of appeals held that venue for the
enforcement of an Arkansas child support decree did not lie in the county of
the father's former residence, in that none of the affected parties lived there
at the time the action was filed. 279 The court so ruled despite the fact that
the father had missed some child support payments under the Arkansas or-
der during his residence in that county. The court of appeals thus reversed
the trial court's denial of the father's motion to transfer venue, and
remanded. 280
272. Id.
273. 747 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ ref'd).
274. Id. at 928-31.
275. Id. at 926.
276. Id., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.003 (Vernon 1984).
277. Id. at 931.
278. 734 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, no writ).
279. Id. at 736-37.
280. Id. at 737.
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